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Introducllon 
Corporations are su町oundedby many part1e' whose inte田stsconflict with their 
own, namely, their customers, vendors, peers, affihated companies such as parent 
and/or subsidiary, business entities m other relevant mdustrial segments includmg 
banks and other financial inst1tut1ons, policy makers, the executive branch, regula-
tory agencies, mass media, couはs,interest groups such as trade associations, con” 
sumer groups, etc These comprise the market and nonmarket environments of a 
firm. In the context of曲目emteracting environments, which can be either support 
iveor問strictiveto the activities of a co中oration,top management has to deteロnine
which industry and its specific business segments the firm can profit in and how to 
stay competitive in their chosen industry and market segmen臼.Here, the former is 
de日nedas co中oratestrategy and the latter as busmess strategy.《＂Sincemany laws 
and regulations set rules and田strictionson business activities, an essential part of a 
business s町ategyis a poht1cal strategy for government public policy which analyzes 
and de日nesways of copmg with由enonmarket environment A political strategy has 
to be formulated and applied with thorough consideration of changiog environments 
and their influence on corporate activities. 
ThIS paper is the beginning of research on a theory of corporate and pohtical 
st四tegychanges related to diversifications under market and nonm町ketforces. The 
U S banking sector, money center banks in particular, was selected to be analyzed 
WI出afoc is on the dynamics of the parties influencing bank strategi田
As is well known, the banking industry has been heavily affected by the Glass-
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Steagall Act which has separated commercial and investment banking since 1933 
The act constrams the activ山田ofcommercial banks; that 1s, they are not legally 
permitted to engage m securibes acbvities. Wi由thisdisadvantage commercial b加 ks
compete in today’s banking market where they are constantly exposed to fierce com-
petition from domestic non-banking mstitutions, such as General Electric, American 
Express田dMemll Lynch (See Table 1 for the types of financial businesses allowed 
to non-b阻 ks), and overseas universal banks and s田 untiesfirms which are not regu 
lated as tightly as US. commercial banks. The rapid development of mformation 
technologies has been drastically changmg the shape and nature of financial prod-
ucts, addmg mo回 complexityto busmess practices for product development, opera-
t10ns and marketing activities Out-dated laws and regulations like Glass-Steagall 
flaw the business playmg field and eliminate players’competitiveness in the market 
ag創nstnew entrants to which the same legal restrictions do not apply. 
Commercial banks in the U.S. are trying to counter the erosion of their business 
areas and diversify mto new business segments such as securities activities and the 
1nsur.叩 cebusiness. To cope with the competitive business environment and出echang-
mg political views of the Glass-Steagall Act, U.S banking institutions have adopted 
V町10uscounter strategies, sometimes those of cnmphance and other times those po-
litically proactive toward legal and regulatory bodies seeking the abolition or revi-
sion of the law. 
Now, US banks are employmg two strategies concurrently. a plea for the amend 
ment of the act and, smce出IStak田 along time to achieve its goal, an approach to出e
regulatory bodies seeking曲目rflexible mterp回tationof 1t In a similar vem, Article 
65 ofJapan’s Securities and Exchange Act of 1948 also strictly separates the banking 
system On both sides of the Pacific b描in,active debate and movement toward the 
abolition of these ineffective laws are cu汀entlyunder way. Prime Mm1ster Hashimoto 
launched his vision of the “Big Bang”of financial industries.'" Japanese banks, 
insur叩 cecompa町田，securiti田 firmsand other relevant parti田町enow seeking strat-
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egies for survival and success for the future. Appropriate strategies for a specific 
issue are not developed from naπ・ow business perspectives but from a combination 
of various views on business, legal and regulatory factors which are a百ectmgor 
might affect co中orauons.
百四問fore,1t is important that this paper analyzes U S bank strategies from both 
出ebusiness and political perspecuves pertainmg to the history of the Glass-Steagall 
Act and to its related regulations. Tracing how the American banks have strategト
cally acted will contnbute to s汀ategyfonnulation for Japanese banks facing the Big 
Bang. 
Here, a view of the inter-relationship among law, government and business, in 
general, IS discussed, mcluding the legal and political constraints over corporate strat-
egies and business activities in bankmg. The Public Policy Life Cycle is used to 
analyze the m司ormilestones of Glass-Steagall and correspondmg banking strate-
g1es We also review the dnving forces of血eenactment of the act 
1. B田iness,law and government 
According to Halverson (1984），出econcept that free competition of goods and 
services 1s fundamental to a sound market has been accepted smce the early days of 
American business history.'" The structure and conduct of big business en問中rises
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have been under legal and regulatory constraints for over a hundred years The 
Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 and other anti trust laws were intro-
duced to prevent a“big”business ente甲nsefrom intentionally or unintentionally 
controlling a large majority share of a market Exclusi叩 ofmonopoly and promo-
ti on off air competit10n have b田n四 importantgoal of the American society. Buchholz 
(1988) states that government is expected “to mamtain a workable competltion by 
both enforcing polici白血atdeal with the size of corporations and the s甘uctureof the 
mdustnes in which they functioo as well as me唱ersand other forms of combinatioo 
and promoting fair competition by making certain anti competitlve practices ile-
gal”｛匂
These socially p田valentand accepted philosophies sometimes encourage law 
make四 topass new acts which end up excessively controlling economic activities of 
business eotities and d田troymgtheir dynamics It can easily be said that what hap-
pened m Congress in the late 1920s and the e町ly30s was a perfect example of this. 、IVhenSenator Glass was persistently trying to enact the Banking Act, the U S and 
出eworld were in the fildst of the Great Depression Day after day countless busi-
ness entities went bankrupt Those were also di伍culttimes for banks During the 
おuryears between 1930 and 1933, more than nine thousand banks suspended opera 
tions同 Aswrit臼nin The House of Morgan, in those econom1cally difficult tim田，
citizens and quite a few politicians we問 notcomfortable with prospering financial 
giants hke J P.Morgan 仰 Also,vanous incidents of unethical activities and miscon 
duct by officers mvolved in securities transactrnns at commercial banks and their 
securities a町iliatescaused financial damage to their custome四，therebyscarring bank 
田putationsand fueling distrust among citizens. The resentment against large banks 
open吋出edoor to the introduction of the Glass-Steagall Act. The formmg of nega-
tive public opinion toward co中orations1s the first stage of the Public Policy Life 
Cycle model by Ryan, Swanson and Buchholz (1987) which is explained in section 
three.開
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2. Underlying Fore田 inthe Enactment of Glass-Steagall 
The Banking Act (the Glass-Steagall Act) passed in Cong回目in1933. The dnv 
ing force w田 SenatorCarter Glass. His efforts to pass出elaw took several years and 
what he finally won is stil in effect although田gulatorybodies, including the Federal 
Reserve Board (the Board), are currently flexible m their inte中間tationof the act 
Under Glass-Steagall, the sep町ationof comme皿ialbankmg and investment banking 
has been keeping U.S commercial banks including money center banks from under-
writing co甲oratesecurities, handling inv田tmentadvisory, managing mutual funds, 
and deahng co叩oratebonds, etc. (However in recent yea四，certamof these activi 
ues have been gradually allowed subject to regulatory approval.) The only opera-
tions perrmtted to a bank under the law are the underwriting of general obligations of 
federal, state叩 dlocal governments and pu陀hasmgor selling secunt1es田 agentson 
behalf of customers pursuant to the customers’specific instructmns 
Pnor to血eGreatDep回目t0nin出e1930s, a number of major commercial banks 
were aggressively expanding血eirsecunties activities through their secunttes affih-
ates. According to Mabuchi (1997), the number of banks d田ctlyor indirectly en-
gaged m securities activities was 566 among the approximately 24,000 U.S. com-
mercial banks (a sum of national banks and state chartered banks) and the vast m司or-
ity of small regional banks were not mvolved m this問 Althoughtraditional mvest-
ment banks had held a dominant share m underwriting new issue secunties, banks 
based in large cities such as the National City Bank of New York (Citicorp) and the 
Chase Natt0nal Bank (Chase) established a wide distribution network to se円 icethe 
retail customers which由einvestment banks did not court The ordinary business 
practice of traditional investment banks we田 thesale of underwritten bonds and 
equities to securities firms with strong distnbution capabthties in their retail sales 
networks. However, some powerful commercial banks with strong retail banking 
capabilities set up their own securities business affiliates targeting the banks' retail 
accounts and ent町・ed由einvestment banking町・ena.
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In the case of Chase which ad primarily grown as a wholesale bank, a geo-
graphical exp皿 s1onbeyond New York state was mitrnted by their security afiliate, 
官官ChaseSecunties Corporat10n (Ch田eSecurities) established in 1917刷羽田com-
pany added ret創lsales to their business ten years later. Since corporate borrowers 
we問 Shi白ingto secunties issuance to finance their necessary funds, holdmg a s住ong
d1stnbution capability with an extensive sales network was a key success factor for 
banks. Chase decided to sel securities uoderwritten by themselves to mdiv1dual 
accounts as well as to institutional investors The issuers we田 notonly m吋orco中0-
rat10ns but also states aロdmunic1paliti田 inthe U.S and foreign boπowers. The 
日nancmgneeds of the issuers m the securities market was so big that there was 
enough room for commercial banks to economically justify their entry mto the un-
de阿国mgof bonds and equities. The volume of new issues underwritten by com-
mercrnl banks' securities affiliates surpassed that of investment banks by the late 
1920’s.＜問In1929，おrtyfive percent of the total securities i田U田 wereunderwritten 
by commercial banks."" Their secun!Ies operations geographically expanded. For 
example, Chase Securities operated in many p町tsof the Uoited States and ove四eas
in London, Pans, Rome, Warsaw and Berhn "" 
When some of由em旬orcommercial banks we回 expandiogtheir secunties ac-
tivities, the share pnces at the New York Stock Exchange experieoced a historical 
overall crash starting on October 24, 1929. The bearish sentiment of由estock mar-
ket immediately spread由roughthe nation’s economic system including the bankmg 
sector. The number of bank defaults jumped from 659 m 1929 to 1,350 in 1930 
followed by 2,293 in 1931, 1,453 in 1932 and 4,000 m 1933.《＂＇ Many depositors 
rushed to the teller windows of banks to withdraw their deposits and banks and de-
pository institutions had difficulty m managing the liquidity necessary to cope with 
their customers’requests Even the Bank of the United States, one of New York’s 
large commercial banks, failed. On March 6, 1933, newly inaugurated Franklin 
Roosevelt closed al the banks in the nation for a week. 
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Senator Glass submitted a proposal to separate commercial banking from invest-
ment banking m出emidst of血isfinancial disorder and finally it was enacted as出e
Banking Act of 1933 A number of factors are said to have con回butedto出ep田sage
of the law; there are four m句orones. Frrst, people lost confidence m the banking 
system with over 9,000 banks in suspension of operations仕om1930出rough1933 
The losses due to the bank failures imposed on depositors, stockholders and other 
creditors reached about $2 5 billion m total 1の
Second, American society became critical of bank securities affiliates p町tlydue 
to the financial damage their customers suffered More than this, the Pecora Hear-
mgs brought unfavorable bank activities to the publlc eyes The hearings on stock 
exchange practices we田 heldby Ferdinand Pecora, counsel to the Senate Banking 
and Currency Committee. The top management of a number of leading banks in出e
nation we町 calledm as witnesses What was disclosed at the hearings, activities 
such as msider tradmg and other unfair tradmg practices conducted by officials of 
banks or thetr securities a百iliates,largely contributed to the formation of negative 
opmions amongst the public ag副nstm吋orbanks 同
Third, Senator Glass was very convinced that banking and secunties operal!ons 
must be separate He believed in the “real bils”doc回ne.1同 Thisidea argued that 
bank assets should consist of only short term and self-liquidating loans to be able to 
meet withdrawal of deposits smce long term lendmg would cause unacceptable lev 
els of liqmdity risk to banks. 川 The“real bils”doctrine convinced Senator Glass 
由atthe securities activities of commercial banks and their affiliates brought the banks 
to financial difficulty and default. However, it is important to note血at“Glassnever 
produced any data to suppo此hisbelief that banks’involvement with securities had 
an adverse effect on either the banking system or the economy, or even on some 
banks.”11" ABA Securil!es Association asser臼thatthe vast m吋orityof the bank 
failures we田 thoseof small rural banks that did not underwnte secuntles and banks 
with securities affiliates survived the difficulty b目白rthan those without such a宜ii-
ates.《19)
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Last，血etop management of Chase and Citicorp, two of Amen ca’s leading banks, 
changed their political strategy and ag回edto divest their securities arms, abandon-
ing叩 yfurther e町ortste> halt由epassage of the act Part of血ereason for出1schange 
of he町ttowards compliance was that the volume of underwriting plummeted be-
commg a much less attractive busmess in the troubled securiti田 marketand weak 
田 onomy.Also, bank management thought presenting the divestiture program of 
their securities operations would improve their damaged co叩orateimages四＇1The 
fi四t回ason1s JUS!lfied from a viewpomt of market environment. Once data shows a 
firm’s busmess segment is highly unlikely to問cover,it should not stay in出atmar-
ket. Also, together w1出血emarlcet factors, the nonmarl<et environmental factors, 
which were出eprevalent negative public image of banks and the likelihood of the 
passage of Glass-Steagall, largely mfluenced their decision making. 
3. Public Policy Life Cycle 
The Public Pohcy Life Cycle (PPLC) model by Ryan, Swanson and Buchholz 
provides a framework to identify s阻g田 ofphenomena, from the formation of dnving 
forces to the 1mplementat10n of public policy. The model also describes strategies 
with which firms manage their external environment; that is government and society. 
It cons1Sts of由r田 stages・publicopini叩 formation,public policy formulation and 
public policy implementation A summary of the nature of the issues and key actors 
m society in each of the stages is listed in Table 2 
τable 2 Public Issue Li晶Cycle
Stage One Two Three 
Na lure of issue Idea Legislatton Law 
Key actor in s田iely P1blic Office Regula I ors
mter°'t holders 
且roups
Source: Ryan, Swanson and Buchholz, Corporate Strareg）防PublicPolicy ond The Fortune 
5αJ, Basil Blackwell, p 46, New York, N Y.,1987 
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The m田nconcern of the corporate strategtst at the initial stage is the growing 
strength of public opimon on an issue important to the firm. Because of the in!luen-
tal power of law makers' constituencies, pohtictans heed their opinions and some-
times p回sentnew legislation which reflects these opinions at congressional sessions 
Since damage control is easier and cheaper 1f measures町eimpl田nentedbefore leg-
islation is written, a wiser strategy would be to publicize, in favorable light, the 
company’S point of view on the issue at hand. Important here is positioning commu 
nicatton as a co田 partof a strategy toward external as well as internal parties of an 
organization. Proactive pa由cipationat press conferences, appearances on radio and 
TV programs, advertisement in m句ornewspapers and magazines, speaking at semi-
n町sand meetmgs of the interest groups, and, nowadays, using the internet give the 
co叩oratemanagement a chance to directly and indi回目lyinfluence public opimon 
The key succ田sfactor m thts communication s佐ategyts to use resources in a manner 
consistent with goals and strategic o句田町田 Commonobjectives of this stage are 
to offer an alternative that would make regulatton unnecessary or cast new light on 
the issue that would convince the public their opmton is unfounded. 
In the second stage of their PPLC model which ts public poltcy formulation, the 
issues are debated among polittci加 Sand specific legislattve proposals町eintroduced 
to CiJngr田SThe degree of impact on corpo阻teinterests ts far larger than the public 
opimon formation in the first stage The pnmary aim is either to support or o句ectto
出eproposed act or work to modify it. Corporate strategists add another ploy to the 
communication strategy, making direct or indirect contact w1血relevantoffice hold-
ers m charge of formal legislation or田gulatoryenactment The methods used are 
lobbying, often through trade associat10ns such as the American Bankers Associa回
tion (ABA) and the Securiti田 IndustryAssociation (SIA), in order to make law mak 
出 andregulators cle町lyund町standof whe回 thefirm (or the ind us町）st田dson the 
issue and making campaign contributions through co叩oratePAC (Political Action 
Committee) to support candidates who take the same stance 
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Corporate PAC is a method of contributing money pooled by qualified members 
such as exec 1tives or adrninis岡山・epersonnel of firms "" A survey by Ryan, Swanson 
and Buchholz of Fortune 500 Industrials showed 56% of the firms had a PAC in 
1980.問 Inthe banking mdustry, many banks mcluding C1t1corp and Chase and also 
回 deassoロations,such as the ABA, have aたwPACs. When a firm wants to lobby, 
senior corporate o節目白areassigned to stay m contact with relevant lawmake四，key
persons m the executive branch and regulatory agencies, and other influential per-
sons like former top officials. Many of the firms have representatives stationed in 
Washington who directly contact politicians and also h1問 professionallobbyists 
The third stage is called the stage of public pohcy implementation Here, since 
the new acts have passed and detailed regulations町ebemg enforced, the available 
options for corporations are limited Corporate management has to work with inter-
nal legal officers, if they have them, and external lawyers to lessen any negative 
financial impact of the new acts on the firm The s汀ategyis to contend their stance, 
usually on speci日cparts of the legislation, at regulatory hearings or court proceed-
mgs. Another strategy available to firms is non-compliance If, when measured, the 
co中oratecosts of compliance with the n巳wact exceed the sum of the estimated time, 
costs and resources to be spent in legal defense, the penalties at a regulatory settle-
ment or court proceeding plus the expect吋 lossof the firms' credibility m the market 
and society, then non compliance could be chosen However, if corporate manage 
ment cannot live with the burdens brought on by the new regulations and prefers to 
take a further but time consuming step, they bring the problem back to the imtial 
stage orPPLC by appealing to the public again. The goal for this action is to reform 
or completely abolish the new act, thus rejuvenating由elife cycle Table 3 shows a 
hst of strategic options in each of the three stages of PPLC. 
However, smce this process requires a long period of time (cu汀entefforts to 
reform Glass-Steagall started in 1980s and have not been success白1),some banks 
have chosen an avenue not descnbed m Table 3・astrategy to seek a flexible reinter-
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pretation That is, while approaching the public and law makers agarn for public 
opmionfoロnatton,firms住yto convince the relevant regulatory authorities that com-
pliance wtth the legtslation 1s causing a senous negative effect on the economy and 
S田kto win a flexible reinterpretation of the act from the regulatory bodies. A senes 
of approvals of greater bank involvement in the securities busmess by the Board 
smce the late 1980s are to some extent products of m句orbanks' practice of this 
political strategy; that is, stressing the social benefits of allowing commercial banks 
to handle securities The Board believes the removal of the restrictions promotes 
efficiency of血efinancial system from which the public will en oy better services. ｛町
Table 3 Strategic Management Model for Public Policy Ism回
Strategic Proc.,s/PPLC 
Stage One P"blic opinion 
formation 
Stage 1¥vo : Pubhc po.Hey 
formulalion 
Stageτbree Public policy 
：π1plementation 
Strategic Options 
Commumcatoon strategies 
Advocacy advertising 
Annual reports 
Corporate newsletters 
Duect meetmgs 
Econom1c edocauon programs 
Image advertising 
Pmsrele回目
P"bhc service anno"ncements 
Reports to government 
Special media presentations 
TV and radio talk shows 
Particir.ation s回tegies
Coahtion butlding 
Lobbying 
Honoranums 
PAC contributions 
Political parties 
Public a町airsgroups 
Public mvice meetmgs 
Trade ass田 mttons
Compliance strategies 
Cooperation with agencies 
Creating a new issue 
Legal resistance 
Judicml proceedings 
Non compliance 
Source: Ryan, Swanson and Buchholz, Corporate Strateg）仏PublicPolicy and The Fortune 
500, Bast! Blackwell, p. 45, New York, N Y.,1987. 
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4. Bank Strategi田 uponPassage of Glass-Steagall 
In the wake of the enactment of Glass-Steagall, al banks anned with sec nities 
a町iliat田 werecompelled to take action to separate them from their banking group 
J.P. Morgan was split into the wholesale commer' 口albank and Morgan Stanley, an 
investment bank Chase and Citicorp decided to dissolve their securities afiliates. 
They no longer found the securities busmess economically and socially attracuve 
because of the sharp回duct10nof business opportunities and their fal町田putation
brought about by the abusive conduct of their o節目rsdisclosed in出ePecora Hear-
ings From the perspective of出ethird s阻geof PPLC. the political s佐ategyof acqm-
田cmgto由esep町山onofinv白tmentbanking from commercial banking implemented 
by bank leaders in the 1930s was. through cooperation with regulatory agencies. a 
compliance strategy towards the government and the public The banks’manage-
ment tned to placate Congress，田gulatorsand the public in order to win a mild regu-
latory implementation of出eact, to obtain an elimination of restriction on interstate 
banking, etc One other advantage of compliance was the abtlity to shift various 
cnrporate resources including time, competent personnel and money away from the 
aihng secunl!es anns and toward their mamstream busmess line which was commer-
cial bankmg. In other words, the political strategies taken by the banks mteracted 
with other business strategies, co叩orates佐ateg1esand environmental changes. Sub-
sequently, however, lack of preventive action m the early stage of PPLC resulted in 
costly legal constraints on their business activ1Ues. 
Both the political strategies and the busmess strategies of business ent山田町e
foロnedto cope with cuπent and future regulatory constraints, sometimes taking ad-
vantage of legal loopholes. However most banks, as well as, the vast m司ontyof 
other co中orauonshave had ffilxed success with this They often fail to keep abreast 
of relevant and vital environmental ch加gesand do not take appropriate action prior 
to the emergence of legal constraints. If political strategies are effectively imple 
mented before a bil is passed, foreseeable costs and losses will lessen. Sometimes 
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the related business area will even expand or opportunities to enter new busmess 
are描 willsurface 
In reality, the ma1or commercial banks in the 1930’s spun off their securities 
affiliates only after losing credibility as a result of the1r unethical activities四 dmis 
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conduct and, because of血epohttcal climate of the day, they viewed出eenactment of 
Glass-Steagall as inevitable. ThlS has proved a costly outcome for血ebanks. Oppor-
同nitylossesおrcommercial banks arising from血econstramts set by Glass-Steagall, 
such as a ban on underwritmg叩中oratebonds, we回 notm訂ginal This IS partly 
evidenced by a clear difference m the profiles of leadmg underwriters in the U S. 
domestic securit1田 andeurobond underwriting league tables (see Table 4 & 5) Table 
4 shows U.S. domestic securities underwriting Commercial banks' underwriting 
volume 1s lagging that of securities firms. This is largely due to the restrictions on 
the underwntmg activities of banks’Sec ti凹 20(of the Glass-Steagall Act) subsidiar-
ies削 Meanwhile,Table 5 indica回 that,in the free eurobond market, the underwrit-
ing volume by banks (includmg both European and Amencan banks) is larger than 
that of secunties houses. This implies that the economic disadvantage of the com 
mercial banks in the U.S. domestic market 1s not negligible because of the lack of 
equal footing w1血 mvestmentbanks 
Smce the late 1980s, more than fifty years after 1933, a senes of relaxations in 
enforcement by regulatory authonties such as the Board and Office of Comptroller 
of the Cu町・encypaved the way for commercial banks, who have been honing由eir
expertise in investment banking in euro markets, to reenter the domestic investment 
banking field and make it a m句orbusiness line. The banks emphasized the social 
benefits of the relaxation and liftmg of the law m their co中orateadvertising, pubhc-
ity and pleas to law makers and regulators悶1The Board also acknowledges the 
social benefits of the expans10n of permissible activities for banks through Section 
20 subsidiaries in terms of econonuc e町iciencyand avadable choices and options for 
consume四，thatis better services for由epublic including lower costs仕umincreased 
competition.【＇＂ The costs to the society would be economic losses which bankmg 
group customers including bank depositors and住ustdepartment customers might 
SU町erfrom conflicts of interest between the two business units and unethical activi 
ties by employees. 
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The Board and some other regulatory bodies became more accommodating to 
requests from large commercial banks, while al the attempts to abolish the Glass 
Steagall Act failed in Congress due to powers佐ugglesamong law makers, one of the 
m司orconcerns of which IS their electorate."" This goes to prove that political strat-
egies have to be carefully managed to cope with changing environments. 
5. Summary 
We have reviewed some of the strategies of money center banks prior to and on 
the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act usmg the PPLC model. Recent regulatory 
reinterpretation has been favorable to commercial banks although血erehas been no 
prog田sin this direction on血epart of Congr田SThe excessively regulatmg Glass-
Steagall Act passed m由emidst of widely growmg negative opinion against banks at 
a time when banks could not take e町ectivepreventive me描uresto halt the passing of 
the bil deprived the banks of m司orways to diversify their四venuesources such as 
fee income, eventually tying down their competitiveness in the market. Reversing 
血esituation, that IS, ＂吋uvenatingthe life cycle in order to reform the act, will 問中間
a high level of mvestment in terms of time, money and human resources as ev1-
denced by the lack of success on Capitol Hill. Therefore, m吋orcommercial banks 
have b田nseeking a flexible reinterpretation from relevant regulatory bodies This is 
making steady progr田S目白
The next part of出ISresearch will be an analysis of how Japanese bank s回 tegies
transformed reactmg to由eprogress of governmental田＇gulationon the separation of 
banking activities under changing business and political environments. The PPLC 
model will be modified to illustrate the history of the reform of the Japanese finan-
c1al system and the shift of Japanese m句orbanks’strategies. Clarifying how bank-
ing mdustries have acted under simtlar restrictions but m曲ediffe回目political,busi 
ness and social settings of Japan四 d由eUS. will contnbute to Japanese commercial 
banks establishmg阻 dmod1fymg their business and political strategtes to stay com-
pe出ivem由eglobal and umve四albanking markets. 
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公共政策ライフサイクJレの観点による，グラス・スティーガル法をめぐる
銀行の政治戦略の分析
前回雅弘
企業戦略は市場参加者に対するだけでなく，多くの法規制が企業活動に多
大な影響を与えることから，公共政策に対する企業戦略，即ち政治戦略の立
案実行が重要である。更にこの政治戦略は変化する環境に対応しなければな
らない。本小論文では，米国で19 3 3年以来，銀行の証券業進出を大きく
制限しているグラス・スティーガル法に対する銀行の政治戦略を，当時の銀
行と政府の動きを中心に公共政策ライフサイクル（PublicPolicy Life 
Cycle:PPLC）モデルの観点より考察する。即ち，同法成立に際しての社会的，
政治的及び経済的背景，それに銀行の政治戦略を，同法の成立及ぴ実施に関
する段階的区分とその各段階に於ける政治戦略行動に即して議論する。その
要点は以下の通りである。
米国では大恐慌を背景に，銀行の証券活動の大幅制限に向けての世論の形
成がなされた（PPLCモデルの第一段階）。銀行は同法成立以前のこの時
点で効果的な防止策を打たなかった故に，その成立後，各行は証券業務から
の撤退を強いられた。その時点で適切なる政治戦略がとられていたならば，
第二段階である現行法の制定及び，第三段階のその実施に至らずに済み，そ
れら第二，第三段階での政治戦略に比べて銀行にとってのコストは低くなっ
ていたであろう。
更に第三段階では，近年，銀行は次の二つの戦略を異なる対象に向けて同
時に実行している。まずは議会に対する法律改正への要求である。他の一つ
はそれが遅々として進まないことから，その代替策として行政監督機関に対
する法律の運用解釈の緩和要請である。その結果，前者に於ては成果が無い
ものの，後者では， 19 8 0年代後半より連邦準備制度理事会他が銀行に有
利な一連の政策を実施している。
